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Tax Exemption of National Banks - McCulloch Revisited
From April 1, 1966, to June 30, 1966, appellant, a national bank or-
ganized under title 12 of the United States Code," paid a total of $575.66
in sales and use taxes to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The tax was
authorized by a recently enacted Massachusetts statute' and was levied pur-
suant to an emergency regulation promulgated by the State Tax Com-
mission which denied the bank tax exemption The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court rejected the bank's claim for a refund, holding that national
banks are neither impliedly nor statutorily exempt from a state sales and
use tax.' Held, reversed: Because of existing congressional legislation! gov-
erning the taxation of national banks, states may not levy even a non-
discriminatory sales and use tax upon a national bank. First Agricultural
National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
I. THE RULE OF FEDERAL TAX IMMuNITY
It is a well established rule that neither the United States nor its agen-
cies and instrumentalities may be taxed without congressional consent!e
This rule originated in McCulloch v. Maryland,' where the Supreme Court
held that a discriminatory tax could not be levied upon a federal instru-
mentality, because such a tax posed a threat to the sovereignty and unity
of the federal government." The Court reasoned that since the "power
to tax involves the power to destroy,"' it is proper for the federal govern-
ment to regulate state taxation of instrumentalities which it is empowered
to create.U
This prohibition on state taxation of federal instrumentalities is clearly
unassailable. 11 However, it is equally clear that such a prohibition may be
imposed upon the states only when it is determined that an institution
claiming immunity is indeed a federal instrumentality.' This determination
has proven difficult to make. In Department of Employment v. United
States' the Supreme Court commented that "there is no simple test for as-
certaining whether an institution is so closely related to governmental ac-
112 U.S.C. S 21 (1964).
2 MASS. STAT, ch. 14, S5 1, 2 (1966).
3229 N.E.2d 245 (Mass. 1967).
41d. at 258.
5 12 U.S.C. 5 548 (1964). See note 41 ifra.
'United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 177 (1943); Brown v. Maryland, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827).
717 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
1id. at 432. It is significant to note that this case involved a discriminatory tax. The poas-
bility of a non-discriminatory tax was not decided. See also note 64 imxra, and accompanying tex.
9Id. at 431.
1O1d. Although under the tensth amendment, powers not delegated to the federal government
are reserved to the states, the states cannot restrict the operations of the federal government when
it is acting under constitutional laws and executing powers vested in it by the Constitution. Id.
at 436. This is because the states delegated such powers to the federal government when they
adopted the Constitution.
"s See note 6 supra.
"
3First Agricultural Natl Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 229 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1967); Liberty
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101, 288 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967).
'"385 U.S. 355 (1966).
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tivity as to become a tax immune instrumentality."' The Court has indi-
cated, however, that an institution must plainly be an "arm of the federal
government"" or be so "assimilated by the Government as to become one
of its constituent parts"1 in order to gain immunity.
In determining what constitutes a federal instrumentality, the Supreme
Court has consistently examined three factors: (1) the charter under
which the institution operates, (2) the services which it performs for the
federal government, and (3) the interest or control which the federal
government has in the institution." However, examination of these three
factors has not always proven conclusive. Many non-banking institutions
have been denied tax immunity even though they operated under the au-
thority and supervision of the federal government. In Railroad Co. v.
Peniston" a subdivision of the state of Nebraska attempted to tax the
property of Union Pacific Railroad Company. The Supreme Court refused
to recognize that the property owned by the company was exempt from
state taxation, although the company had been chartered by the federal
government, was relied upon to transport mail and other public supplies,
and two of its directors could be appointed by the United States gov-
ernment. The Court said that many businesses are employed in the national
service and that to prohibit state taxation of a privately owned corporation
such as Union Pacific would "greatly embarrass the States in the collection
of their necessary revenue without any corresponding advantage to the
United States."" The Court further noted that while the powers and inter-
ests of the federal government must be protected, a privately owned insti-
tution is not impliedly immune from state taxation simply because part of
its business involves the public interest.
In a similar decision,"* the Supreme Court upheld a state tax upon a
company's production and sale of electricity, even though the company was
operating with the permission, and under the supervision, of the federal
government. The Court reasoned that a tax exemption was unwarranted
because the company was privately owned and engaged in the production
of an article of trade solely for profit."' In other decisions, the Supreme
Court has held that there is no implied immunity from state taxation
where a private contractor performs a contract with the federal govern-
ment," a lessee of tax-exempt Indian lands produces petroleum," or where
14Id. at 358-59.
"5Id. at 359.
"United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958).
"Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359 (1966); United States v.
Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958); Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102
(1941); Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 343 (1923).
8 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) $ (1873).
'old. at 33.
"Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178 (1932).
"2Id. at 180, 181.
"United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941);
Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134
(1937). These cases overruled Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928), which held
that a private contractor dealing with the federal government was immune from state taxation.
"Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949). This case overruled Choctaw,
Okla., & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914), which granted immunity to a company
dealing with Indian lands.
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a private corporation fulfills a government contract while using a gov-
ernment-owned plant."
II. FEDERAL BANKS-EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL BANK
McCulloch and Osborn v. Bank of the United States' represent the first
significant attempts to tax a federally created bank. At issue in those cases
was the second Bank of the United States, predecessor of the national bank.
Organized under a charter granted in 1816,2' this bank was closely related
to the federal government. It is significant that (1) the government owned
twenty per cent of its capital stock, (2) the President of the United States
had the power to appoint five of its twenty-five directors, (3) the treasurer
of the United States was required to deposit all federal monies in the bank,
(4) the bank was authorized to transmit federal funds and issue paper
currency, and (5) the bank acted as the fiscal agent of the United States
by handling United States foreign exchange transactions.
In McCulloch the Supreme Court held that the bank was a federal in-
strumentality and that a tax placed upon the paper currency issued by the
bank was unconstitutional." However, in dicta the Court observed that a
state was able to levy a tax upon the bank's real estate or upon the interests
held in the institution by citizens of the state."' In Osborn the Court held
unconstitutional a $50,000 tax placed upon each office of the Bank of the
United States within the taxing state. Although the state contended that
the tax was levied on the bank as a corporate entity and not as an agency
of the public, the Court declined to make such a distinction. A tax upon
the bank's operations, said the Court, would impair the utility of the in-
stitution to the federal government.' In each case the Court noted that the
tax was clearly discriminatory because no such tax was imposed upon
state banks. As a result, the Court declared that any tax which affected the
operations of the bank could no more be allowed than a tax upon the fed-
eral government itself. 1
These cases clearly established that the Bank of the United States was a
federal instrumentality, and therefore entitled to immunity from state
taxation. During the years that followed, however, the United States faced
grave economic problems which demanded legislative innovations in bank-
ing." These innovations were largely concerned with the creation and de-
velopment of the modern national bank. The history of this latter institu-
tion serves to illustrate the differences between it and the Bank of the
United States.
"
4 United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
2522 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
"Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266.
27
P. STUDENSKi & H. Kioos, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF TE UNITED STATES 83-84 (1952).
" The Court made this determination after establishing that Congress had the power to create
such a bank under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
412 (1819). See also note 10 sup4ra.
2917 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
"022 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 862 (1824).
3ljd. at 864; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819).
8aP. STUDENSKI & H. KRoos, sutra note 27, at 137.
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Development of the National Bank. In an effort to stabilize currency dur-
ing the Civil War years, Congress passed the National Bank Act of 1863.3
Under this Act, state banks could receive a charter from the United States
upon deposit of federal funds with the Treasury Department." However,
because of less stringent banking regulations, " and the resulting tendency
of banks to prefer state charters, Congress amended the National Bank
Act in 1864.s' This amendment imposed a tax upon the operations of state
banks. In the following year Congress increased the tax, thereby making
it even more desirable to operate under a federal charter.?' Since McCul-
loch was assumed to exempt national banks from state taxation except on
their real estate or upon the interest held in the bank by citizens of the
taxing states banks were naturally encouraged to convert to national
banks. This deprived the states of a valuable source of tax revenue."
Therefore, in 1868, Congress provided by statute for state taxation of na-
tional banks.' This statute, which originally merely echoed the dicta of
McCulloch, has been revised to enlarge the states' power to tax national
banks.a
Significant banking innovations in this century have also served to dis-
tinguish the national bank from the Bank of the United States.4C In 1913,
Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act," which provided for the estab-
lishment of federal reserve banks to issue currency and act as federal
depositories." Indeed, since 1935, national banks have issued no currency'
and have become increasingly similar to state banks. ' These changes have
sAct of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
P. STUDENSKX & H. KRoos, supra note 27, at 1 IS.
s Id. at 15 4.
sAct of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
87Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 484. See P. STUDENSKI & H Kitoos, supra note 27,
at 1 5. The constitutionality of this tax upon state banks was upheld in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
3817 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
sP. SruDENsas & H. Kkoos, supra note 27, at 155.
40Act of Feb. 10, 1868, ch. 7, 15 Stat. 34.
4' 12 U.S.C. S $48 (1964) provides:
The legislature of each State may determine and direct subject to the provisions
of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking
associations located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said shares, or
(2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an owner or holder
thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income, or (4) according to or
measured by their net income, provided the following conditions are complied with:
1. (a) The imposition by any State of any one to the above four forms of taxation
shall be in lieu of the others ....
The statute further provides for the taxing of real property of national banking associations, but
requires that such a tax, as well as the above four, be non-discriminatory.
4 See P. SalrENSai & IL Kxoos, supra note 27, at 259.
"Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251.
" 12 U.S.C. § $31 (1964). Federal reserve banks must be distinguished from member banks of
the Federal Reserve System. There is one Federal Reserve Bank in each of 8 to 12 districts as provid-
ed for by Congress in 12 U.S.C. 5 222 (1964). Member banks may be either state banks or na-
tional banks. Although national banks are required to become members, state banks are also per-
mitted to join. 12 U.S.C. S 321 (1964).
P. STnDENSKI & H. Kaoos, supra note 27, at 259.
Examples of functions conferred upon national banks by Congress are (a) branch banking,
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1964); (b) fiduciary powers, 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (1964); (c) rate of inter-
est on loans, 12 U.S.C. S 85 (1964); (d) capitalization, 12 U.S.C. S 51 (1964); (e) interest on
time and savings deposits, 12 U.S.C. S 371 (1964). See First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State
Tax Commn 392 U.S. 339, 357 (1968).
clearly diminished the importance of national banks as fiscal agents of the
federal government.'
III. FIRST AGRICULTURAL NATIONAL BANK V. STATE TAX COMMISSION
In First Agricultural the Court declined to re-examine the role of the
modern national bank in order to decide the constitutional question of
whether the bank "is so closely related to governmental activity as to be-
come a tax immune instrumentality." Instead, the Court declared itself
bound by the great body of precedent concerned with the immunity of na-
tional banks' and the legislative history and construction of 12 U.S.C.
section 5 4 8 ,"0 the statute governing taxation of national banks.
The Court noted that before the enactment of section 548 the tax status
of national banks was greatly debated, and that section 548 is a compro-
mise, permitting the taxation prescribed by McCulloch as well as in four
additional areas. 1 Dismissing a contrary contention by the Tax Commis-
sion, the Court held that section 548 prescribes the only means for state
taxation of national banks." Indeed, there is strong authority for such a
conclusion. In Bank of California v. Richardson' the Court held that sec-
tion 548 was intended to "comprehensively control the subject with which
it dealt," and "furnish the exclusive rule" for state taxation of national
banks." In Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather" the Court again
held that section 548 was designed to prevent any form of state taxation
not specifically enumerated in the statute."
By reference to the legislative history of section 548, the Court pre-
cluded the argument that national bank immunity is a result of "legislative
oversight." Importance was attached to the fact that in 1923, section 548
was amended" to correct a Supreme Court decision which had attempted
to broaden the definition of taxable national bank property. The Court
also noted that a bill which specifically would have permitted sales and
use taxes to be levied upon national banks was defeated by Congress in
1950. Thus, the Court concluded that if a change is to be made in the tax
status of national banks, it must come from Congress."
"'P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOS, supra note 27, at 259.
48 392 U.S. at 341. This was the test applied in Department of Employment v. United States,
385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966).
'First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927); Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather,
263 U.S. 103 (1923); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 (1899). The Court also
relied upon dicta supporting national bank immunity. Department of Employment v. United
States, 385 U.S. 355, 360 (1966).
5"See note 41 supra.
"53'92 U.S. at 342-43.
51ld. at 343.
5" 248 U.S. 476 (1919).
"Id. at 483.
5263 U.S. 103 (1923).
'old. at 107. See Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 669 (1899).
"Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 267, 42 Star. 1499.
"See Hearings on S. 2547 Before the Subcomm. on Federal Reserve Matters of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., lst Sess. 9 (1950).
"'First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 346 (1968). Having
reached this conclusion, the Court turned to another contention raised by the Tax Commission, viz.,
that the incidence of the tax did not fall upon the bank and that, as a result, the tax was permissible
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Three Justices" joined in dissenting from the decision, believing that the
constitutional question should have been decided. Speaking for the dis-
senters, Mr. Justice Marshall observed that "the refusal to decide the issue
gives further life to a largely outmoded doctrine." ' The dissent also noted"
that "virtually all of the later cases in which national banks have been held
to be federal instrumentalities" have been based upon McCullocb, Osborn,
and Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro." Justice Marshall indicated
that these cases should be read simply for the principle that the Constitu-
tion prohibits a state from taxing discriminatorily a federally established
instrumentality."
Citing Tradesmen's National Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Commission," the
dissent interpreted section 548 as a measure designed only to prevent dis-
criminatory taxation, and not as an exhaustive provision of permissible
taxes. It was felt that such an interpretation would allow Congress an
opportunity to "re-evaluate the situation." Justice Marshall noted that
the burden should be placed upon the party seeking to prove, rather than
upon the party seeking to disprove, that a tax exempt status exists.'
IV. CONCLUSION
First Agricultural National Bank v. State Tax Commission seems diffi-
cult to reconcile with cases involving non-banking institutions. Indeed,
while non-banking institutions claiming tax immunity have been sub-
jected to a careful examination of their nature and relation to the federal
government," national banks have largely escaped such scrutiny." The
Court in First Agricultural appeared not to follow its own trend toward
restricting the "scope of immunity of private persons seeking to clothe
themselves with governmental character."" In light of prior decisions, 1
and the legislative history of section 548, the Court's interpretation of the
scope of this statute seems to be correct. However, the question of statu-
tory construction should be reached only after it has been accurately de-
termined that national banks are federal instrumentalities." The view of
even in the absence of congressional authorization. Referring to the language of the statute, the
Court concluded that the incidence of the tax did fall upon the bank and thus could not be
allowed. In so holding, the Court noted that "we are not bound by the state court's characteriza-
tion of the tax." Id. at 347.
GoMr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart joined. Mr.
Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
61 392 U.S. at 349.
82ld. at 350.
03 173 U.S. 664 (1899).
"392 U.S. at 351.
5 309 U.S. 560, 567 (1940).
a392 U.S. at 363.
6I Id.
a Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 352 (1948). See cases cited notes 22, 23
sutss'.
"Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 352 (1948).
TO id.
7 See text accompanying notes $4, 56 ss pra. But tee Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, 365
U.S. 467 (1960).
"Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101, 288 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1967).
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the dissenting opinion and that of cases overruled by the Court's decision"'
leave some doubt as to whether such an accurate determination was made
in First Agricultural.
Perhaps the Court's decision may be justified by virtue of the fact that
national banks do perform some significant services for the federal gov-
ernment.4 The question, however, is not whether such responsibilities are
entrusted to national banks, but whether greater responsibilities are en-
trusted to them than to other banks. It is the avowed policy of the Court
not to pass upon constitutional questions if there is some other ground
upon which the case may be decided." The Court may have had this policy
in mind in holding section 548 to be controlling. However, if national
banks are not federal instrumentalities, Congress is without authority to
accord them preferential treatment."° While the McCulloch decision pro-
tected national banks from discrimination, the effect of the First Agricul-
tural decision may be to discriminate against state banks.
S. David Blinn
"s Id.
"'National banks are required to become members of the Federal Reserve System, which
subjects them to careful federal regulation. See 12 U.S.C. S 222 (1964). Bul see notes 44, 46
snui'a.
' Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
"aUnited States v. Detroit, 351 U.S. 466 (1958).
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